The inner conflict of liberalism in defining the limits to state coercion in relation to social media by Fellows, Jamie
The Inner Conflict of Liberalism in Defining the Limits to State 
Coercion in relation to Social Media 
Posted on February 17, 2016by Res Judicata: Contemporary Issues in Administrative and Public Law.  
https://resjudicatablog.wordpress.com 
 
By Jamie Fellows (Lecturer in Law at James Cook University) 
 
The genesis of the problem between social media and State regulation can be seen 
as an issue relating to competing rights – on the one hand the rights of users to use 
this technology unfettered from State interference and on the other, the right of 
society to be protected from the myriad of harms that are alleged to stem from the 
use of social media.  As such, even if one is to accept the tenets of liberalism as a 
legitimate political philosophy, it is arguable that liberalism itself is predisposed to an 
inner conflict when assessing the limits of State coercion and individual rights.  This 
is due in part to the inherent flexibility or benefits, some would assert, within 
liberalism to allow for varying interpretations of the same social phenomena. That is 
to say, even within a society where liberalism is the accepted hegemonic system 
there is no uniform determination of what constitutes a legitimate level of State 
control as this would vary according to the social context and question for 
consideration. 
Proponents of a liberalist philosophy could still be at odds due to the possibility of a 
number of contrasting interpretive outcomes, the culmination of which must be seen 
as valid as the next one since it could be seen that there would still be conflict 
between those who advocate varying degrees of State intervention over others who 
do not.  This is despite both groups being proponents of a liberalist philosophy.  The 
same could be applied to the issue of regulating social media. One could assert that 
the multiplicity of the levels of State intervention within liberalism is predicated on the 
varying degrees of acceptability that the State exercises with respect to possible 
infringements upon an individual’s freedom to express one’s self unfettered by 
restrictions from the State.  It is this notion of freedom or liberty that is at the 
cornerstone of liberal democracy and that which creates the greatest conflict for the 
State. 
On the one hand there exists the idea that an individual should be free to use social 
media while at the same time the State has a responsibility to ensure that society is 
free from the socially destructive elements that have been attributed to social 
media.  The challenge for the State lies at the realms of understanding the nature or 
the role of the State in an environment so heavily characterised by rapid 
developments in social media technology.  The only way to fully understand this role 
is to engage the issues at a fundamental level which takes into consideration a range 
of philosophical positions.  Otherwise all that can be achieved is ad hoc solutions 
that attempt to patch the symptoms of the problem rather than address the core of 
the issue. 
In part, the cause of the juxtaposition between State understanding and technology 
relates to the gaps in contemporary legal understanding between social media and 
the function of the law.  The apparent discord between the pace of the development 
of social media and our legal understanding of the phenomena at a jurisprudential 
level is evident by the lack of sophisticated discourse and engagement by the legal 
profession and the State.  In achieving a better understanding of the way law 
operates with social media, it is submitted that the primary discord between the 
current use of this technology and our own understanding of how the law does and 
should interact with it, can be attributed to the fact that there is little understanding on 
a theoretical level, at least, of the law’s function in regulating this sort of technology. 
Any regulation would intuitively take into account a range of attributes that can be 
applied against a theoretical framework in order to determine the legitimacy (or 
illegitimacy as the case may be) of creating a legislative regime for social media.  In 
the absence of engaging in such a process, law is created void of any philosophical 
basis for its justification, other than its own existence being used to justify it in a 
positivist sense; that is, it exists, therefore it is valid.  To date, there has been very 
little research undertaken at the theoretical level that looks at the various attributes 
which form part of the social networking media phenomena and the advantage of 
doing so now represents opportunities to assist law makers.  As such, it would 
appear the means by which to regulate and whether it should be regulated, remains 
unsettled. 
Since any imposition of regulation in one area may have consequences in another; 
freedom of expression, criminalization of marginal anti-social behaviour and general 
subjugation of personal freedoms, for example, are possible consequences resulting 
from greater regulation of social media.  Therefore, an essential part of this 
discussion will seek to understand whether the imposition of regulation is justified in 
terms of an appropriate philosophical or theoretical basis while keeping in mind that 
any greater regulation than what presently exists, might unduly restrict society as a 
whole.  Certainly a dominant position might be described as a utilitarian balance 
between the individual’s ‘right’ to use this technology versus the harms this 
technology may cause?  That is, is a utilitarian perspective a suitable framework in 
which to assess the matter, or should we look beyond this to an ethics-based 
approach? 
